First proposed by Wang and Li in 2007, workflow resiliency is a policy analysis for ensuring that, even when an adversarial environment removes a subset of workers from service, a workflow can still be instantiated to satisfy all the security constraints. Wang and Li proposed three notions of workflow resiliency: static, decremental, and dynamic resiliency. While decremental and dynamic resiliency are both PSPACE-complete, Wang and Li did not provide a matching lower and upper bound for the complexity of static resiliency.
INTRODUCTION
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability are three essential goals of security. This paper is about availability considerations in workflow authorization models.
A workflow is an application-level abstraction of a business process. Access control in a workflow application is captured in a workflow authorization model [1, 3, 7, 37, 38] , the main idea of which is to realize the Principle of Least Privilege [35] through permission abstraction [2] . Instead of granting permissions directly to users, permissions are granted to the steps of a workflow. When a user is assigned to perform a step in the workflow, the permissions are then made available to the user. Two additional access control features are typically found in a workflow authorization model. First, qualification requirements can be imposed on each workflow step. An example is to require that the "Prepare Budget" step be carried out by an "Account Clerk, " while the "Account Review" step be carried out by an "Account Manager" (example taken from [40] ). This is typically framed in terms of roles in an underlying Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model. Second, further security constraints may be imposed across steps to prevent abuse. A classical example would be separation-of-duty constraints: e.g., the "Create Payment" step and the "Approve Payment" step must be carried out by two distinct users (example taken from [15] ). Recent works in workflow authorization models have considered arbitrary binary constraints, thereby introducing into workflow authorization models an element of Relationship-Based Access Control (ReBAC) [25, 39, 40] .
As permissions are now encapsulated in workflow steps, we want to make sure that the workflow can actually be executed, or else the situation amounts to a denial of service. In other words, one must ensure that it is possible to assign users to workflow steps, so that all qualification requirements and security constraints are satisfied. This notion of availability has been known in the literature as the workflow satisfiability problem (WSP) [3, 7, 15, 40] . WSP can be used as a policy analysis to help the workflow developer debug her formulation, so that the latter is not overly constrained.
A major landmark in the study of the WSP has been the work of Wang and Li [39, 40] , who first introduced into the literature the application of Fixed Parameter Tractable (FPT) algorithms [21] to solve WSP. Subsequently, major breakthroughs in the design of FPT algorithms for WSP have been invented by the research group at Royal Holloway University of London, including kernelization algorithms [8, 14, 15] , exploitation of problem symmetry in patternbased algorithms [5, 6] , and novel problem formulations [9, 12] , A second major contribution of Wang and Li's work is the introduction of an advanced notion of availability that is stronger than workflow satisfiability. That notion is workflow resiliency [39, 40] , the subject of this paper. The idea is to anticipate catastrophes that may remove users from service. One would like to ensure that, even if the adversarial environment has taken away a certain number of users, the workflow is still satisfiable by the remaining personnel. More specifically, Wang and Li proposed three different notions of workflow resiliency, namely, static, decremental, and dynamic resiliency. While decremental and dynamic resiliency have been shown to be PSPACE-complete, Wang and Li did not provide a matching upper and lower bound for the complexity of static resiliency: static resiliency is in Π p 2 and is NP-hard. Whether static resiliency is Π p 2 -complete has remained an open problem since the notion was first conceived a decade ago. Bridging this complexity gap is the first motivation of this work.
The last few years have witnessed a renewed interest in the study of workflow resiliency [10, [29] [30] [31] . Two lines of research have been representative. The first is the work of Mace et al. [29] [30] [31] , who argue that it is more important to assess to what (quantitative) degree of resiliency a workflow enjoys, rather than to test if the workflow is resilient or not (binary). The goal is to offer guidance to the workflow developer in terms of refining the formulation of the business process.
While Mace et al.'s approach is valuable, it is the position of this paper that deep insights of the workflow can be gained by evaluating the workflow against multiple and incomparable notions of workflow resiliency: e.g., statically resilient for a budget of t 1 and decrementally resilient for a budget of t 2 , where t 2 < t 1 . In fact, each notion of workflow resiliency captures a family of attack scenarios. Confirming that a workflow is resilient in terms of several incomparable notions of resiliency offers deep insight into the formulation of the workflow. We therefore need a good number of notions of workflow resiliency, rather than just a few. More than that, we need notions of workflow resiliency that are not computationally prohibitive to test. Unfortunately, a pessimistic reader of Wang and Li may come to the (unwarranted) conclusion that static resiliency is an exception rather than a rule, and that most notions of workflow resiliency are PSPACE-complete. This pessimism is understandable as the notions of workflow resiliency proposed by Wang and Li are formulated in terms of strategic games. If resiliency is fundamentally a PSPACE-complete phenomenon, then hoping for an efficient solution may be unrealistic. A second motivation of this work is to demonstrate that there are indeed useful notions of workflow resiliency that are not as prohibitive as decremental and dynamic resiliency.
A second line of recent work in workflow resiliency is that of Crampton et al. [10] , who devised a first FPT algorithm for deciding dynamic resiliency. The parameter they used was k + t, where k is the number of steps in the workflow, and t is the number of users that the adversary can remove. While k is universally accepted to be a small parameter in the literature [15, 40] , t is not. For example, if t is a fixed fraction of the number of users (e.g., 5% of the user population), it already grows much faster than is acceptable for an FPT algorithm. It is the position of this paper that parameterizing the problem using t is not fruitful (see §8, however, for an example of adversary models in which such a parameterization could make sense). In this light, non-FPT approaches are still valuable when t is not a small parameter. The formulation of algorithmic solutions for workflow resiliency without assuming a small t is the third motivation of this work. This paper has three contributions:
(1) In §3, static resiliency is proven to be Π p 2 -complete, thereby bridging the long-standing complexity gap in the work of Wang and Li [39, 40] . This result also provides the intellectual justification for the third contribution below. (2) In §4, we dispel the pessimistic interpretation of Wang and Li's work by formulating a new notion of workflow resiliency, one-shot resiliency, which is more sophisticated than static resiliency, and nevertheless remains in the third level of the polynomial hierarchy (Σ p 3 -complete). This means that useful notions of workflow resiliency can be formulated without flirting with PSPACE-completeness. (3) We advocate the use of Answer Set Programming (ASP) [22, 23] , a modern constraint-solving technology, for deciding static and one-shot resiliency. ASP has been shown to be particularly fitted for reasoning problems in the lower levels of the polynomial hierarchy [4, 19, 20, 34] . In §6, we demonstrate the feasibility of this approach by presenting ASP encodings of static and one-shot resiliency. These reductions employ an encoding technique known as the model saturation technique [19, 20] . This solution approach does not require the parameter t to be small.
BACKGROUND: WORKFLOW SATISFIABILITY AND RESILIENCY
This section provides a brief introduction to workflow satisfiability and resiliency, in order to prepare the reader to understand the rest of this paper. All the materials presented in this section have already appeared in previous work (particularly [39, 40] ).
Workflow Satisfiability
A workflow is the abstract representation of a business process. Steps are tasks to be executed by users, and the partial ordering expresses the causal dependencies among steps. If two steps are ordered by ≺, then they must be executed in that order; otherwise, they can interleave in any arbitrary manner.
When a workflow is executed, users are assigned to the steps, sometimes in an incremental manner. Definition 2.2. Given a workflow (S, ) and a set U of users, a partial plan is a function θ : T → U such that (a) T ⊆ S, and (b) θ is causally closed: that is, for s 1 , s 2 ∈ S, if s 1 ∈ T and s 2 ≺ s 1 , then s 2 ∈ T . A partial plan θ is also called a plan when dom(θ) = S.
Security constraints, such as seperation of duty, may be imposed on a workflow in order to prevent abuse. Definition 2.3 (in the style of [5, 6] ). A workflow authorization policy W is a 5-tuple (S, , U , A, C), where the components are defined as follows:
• (S, ) is a workflow.
• U is a set of users.
• A ⊆ S × U is the step authorization policy, which lists for each step those users who are qualified to carry out the step.
• C is a set of constraints. Each constraint has the form (T , Θ).
The set T ⊆ S specifies the steps constrained by the constraint. The component Θ is a set of partial plans, each with T as its domain. The set Θ specifies the combinations of assignments that are permitted by the constraint.
The following definition specifies when a (partial) plan satisfies the requirements imposed by a workflow authorization policy. Definition 2.4. Suppose θ is a partial plan for the workflow authorization policy W = (S, , U , A,C). We say that θ is valid if and only if the following conditions hold:
• For every step s ∈ S, (s, θ(s)) ∈ A.
• For every constraint (T , Θ) ∈ C, if T ⊆ dom(θ), then there exists θ ′ ∈ Θ such that for every s ∈ T , θ(s) = θ(s) ′ . A plan is valid if and only if it is valid as a partial plan.
The following are some examples of constraints. Following [39, 40] , we focus mostly on entailment constraints, including the generalization by [14, 15] . Our ASP encodings of §6 can easily handle the cardinality constraints of [14, 15] as well.
Example 2.5. Suppose S is a set of steps, and U is a set of users.
• Suppose S 1 and S 2 are non-empty subsets of S, and ρ ⊆ U × U is a binary relation. We write ent(ρ, S 1 , S 2 ) to denote the entailment constraint (T , Θ) for which T = T 1 ∪ T 2 , and
• Crampton et al. classify entailment constraints in to various types [14, 15] . A type-1 entailment constraint is one in which both step sets are singleton sets. We overload notation and write ent(ρ, s 1 , s 2 ) to denote ent(ρ, {s 1 }, {s 2 }). A type-2 entailment constraint is one in which exactly one of the two step sets is a singleton set. A type-3 entailment constraint is one in which neither of the step sets is a singleton set.
• The separation-of-duty constraint sod(s 1 , s 2 ) is the type-1 entailment constraint ent( , s 1 , s 2 ). Similarly, the bindingof-duty constraint bod(s 1 , s 2 ) is defined to be ent(=, s 1 , s 2 ).
When one formulates a workflow authorization policy, one must ensure that the constraints are not overly restrictive to the point that no valid plan exists. Definition 2.6. A workflow authorization policy W is satisfiable if and only if at least one valid plan exists. WSP is the language of workflow authorization policies that are satisfiable. Even though WSP is theoretically intractable, previous work has demonstrated that it can be decided with moderate efficiency by apply modern SAT solving technologies [40] , and with even greater efficiency by Fixed-Parameter Tractable algorithms [5, 6, 15, 40] .
Workflow Resiliency
For mission critical business processes, a degree of availability higher than workflow satisfiability is often desired. The basic idea is to anticipate catastrophic events, which may render some users unavailable for duty. The goal is to ensure that there is enough redundancy in human resources so that the workflow can execute to completion even when accidents occur.
The first notion of workflow resiliency models a workflow that runs for a very short period of time (e.g., in minutes). Some users become unavailable prior to workflow execution. Due to the short duration of the workflow, no further users are removed from service. [39, 40] ). A workflow authorization policyW = (S, , U , A, C) is statically resilient for an integer budget t ≥ 0 if and only if, for every subset ∆ of U that has size t or less, there is a valid plan θ : S → (U \ ∆) that does not assign the users in ∆.
Definition 2.8 (Static Resiliency
Workflow resiliency is typically described in terms of two-person games: Player 1 attempts to construct a valid plan, while Player 2, who models the adversarial environment, counters Player 1 by removing users from service. Static resiliency can thus be modelled by a two-person game that is played in one round: Player 2 first removes up to t users, and then Player 1 constructs a valid plan with the remaining users. A workflow authorization policy is statically resilient when Player 1 can win no matter how Player 2 plays.
The next notion of workflow resiliency models the situation in which the workflow runs for a moderately long time (e.g., within a day). During the execution of the workflow, more and more users become unavailable. Definition 2.9 (Decremental Resiliency [39, 40] ). A workflow authorization policy W = (S, , U , A, C) is decrementally resilient for integer budget t ≥ 0 if and only if Player 1 can win the decremental resiliency game no matter how Player 2 plays.
The decremental resiliency game is a two-player game that proceeds in rounds. At any time, the configuration of the game is a pair (∆, θ), where ∆ ⊆ U , and θ is a partial plan. In the initial configuration, both ∆ and θ are ∅.
Each round begins by Player 2 choosing some users from U to be added to ∆, so long as |∆| ≤ t. (A legitimate special case is when no user is chosen. Also, users added to ∆ remain there until the end of the game.) Next, Player 1 extends θ by assigning a user from U \ ∆ to a not-yet-assigned step.
Player 2 wins right away if U \∆ becomes empty, or if θ becomes invalid. Player 1 wins if θ is eventually turned into a valid plan (i.e., every step is assigned a user).
The third notion of workflow resiliency models situations in which the workflow runs for an extended period of time (e.g., in days). Once an accident occurs to remove some users from service, they return to work before the next accident has a chance to occur. Definition 2.10 (Dynamic resiliency [39, 40] ). A workflow authorization policy W = (S, , U , A, C) is dynamically resilient for integer budget t ≥ 0 if and only if Player 1 can win the dynamic resiliency game no matter how Player 2 plays.
The dynamic resiliency game is a two-player game that proceeds in rounds. At any time, the configuration of the game is a partial plan θ. Initially, θ is ∅.
Each round begins by Player 2 choosing a subset ∆ of U such that |∆| ≤ t. Next, Player 1 extends θ by assigning a member of U \ ∆ to a not-yet-assigned step.
Player 2 wins right away if ∆ = U , or if θ becomes invalid. Player 1 wins if θ is eventually turned into a valid plan.
We write SRCP for the language of pairs (W , t) for which W is statically resilient for a budget t. Similarly, we write CRCP and DRCP for the respective language of decremental and dynamic resiliency.
The three notions of resiliency are totally ordered in terms of how demanding they are.
Note the proper set inclusion in the statement above. While SRCP is the least demanding notion of resiliency among the three, its computational complexity is also the least intimidating. 
STATIC RESILIENCY REVISITED
The first main contribution of this work is the following result:
In addition to providing a matching lower bound for Wang and Li's upper bound (Theorem 2.12), this result has practical implications for the choice of solution strategy for SRCP. Π p 2 -completeness implies that it is unlikely one can employ SAT -solving technologies to solve SRCP. One is now driven to employ constraint-solving technologies that are designed for problems in the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. As we shall see in §5, one such technology is Answer-Set Programming.
P
. We sketch a polynomial-time Karp reduction from the Π p 2 -complete problem, Dynamic Hamiltonian Circuit (DHC) [26, 36] , to SRCP.
Problem: DHC [26]
Instance: A simple graph 1 G = (V , E), and an edge set B ⊆ E. Question: Is it the case that for every D ⊆ B with |D| ≤ |B|/2, G D has a Hamilton cycle?
The proposed reduction takes as input an instance of DHC, which consists of a graph G = (V , E) and a set B ⊆ E. The reduction returns an instance of SRCP consisting of a budget t = |B|/2 and a workflow authorization policy (S, , U , A, C):
(1) S = SV ∪ SE is a set of 2N steps, where N = |V |:
These steps model a Hamiltonian cycle: each step in SV models a vertex in the Hamiltonian cycle, and each step in SE corresponds to an edge in the Hamiltonian cycle.
(2) The partial order is simply the equality relation (=). In other words, steps can be executed in any order. (3) U = UV ∪ UE is the set of users defined as follows:
Intuitively, the users represent vertices and edges in graph G. A plan, which assigns users to steps, effectively identifies vertices and edges that participate in the Hamiltonian cycle. All vertices and those edges not in B have t + 1 copies (see (1) and (2)). That means the adversary cannot make these vertices and edges unavailable by removing t users. There are, however, only one copy of those edges in B (see (3)). The adversary can prevent these edges from participating in the Hamiltonian cycle.
1 An undirected graph is simple if it contains neither loops nor multi-edges.
(4) The step authorization policy A ensures that users representing vertices are assigned to steps representing vertices, and the same for edges.
The constraint set C = C cir ∪ C ham is made up of two types of constraint. Intuitively, the constraints in C cir ensure that each valid plan identifies a circuit of size N = |V |, while the constraints in C ham ensure that the identified circuit is Hamiltonian.
(a) C cir is a set of type-1 entailment constraints induced by the binary relation incident. For every edge e ∈ E connecting vertices u, ∈ V , define a binary relation incident e ⊆ U × U :
In other words, incident e relates a user representing e to a user representing one of the two vertices connected by e. Now, incident is defined as follows:
We also write incident −1 to represent the converse 2 of incident. In short, incident −1 relates a user representing a vertex to a user representing an edge that has that vertex as one of its two ends. Now, define C cir = C 1 ∪C 2 ∪C 3 :
The overall effect of the constraints in C cir is that a valid plan identifies a circuit in the graph. (b) C ham contains type-1 entailment constraints that are specified using the binary relation distinct ⊆ U × U :
Intuitively, two users are related by distinct whenever they represent two distinct vertices. C ham can now be defined as follows:
Effectively, C ham ensures that any circuit identified by a valid plan passes through pairwise distinct vertices: i.e., the circuit is a Hamiltonian cycle. It is obvious that the reduction can be computed in time polynomial to the size of the DHC instance. Observe also the following:
(1) There is a one-to-one correspondence between a valid plan of W and a Hamiltonian cycle in G. (2) For every choice of D ⊆ B with |D| ≤ |B|/2, there is a corresponding set of no more than t users from e ∈B UE e that the adversary can remove. (3) When the adversary removes t users from U , no more than t of them belong e ∈B UE e . These latter users correspond to a choice of D ⊆ B with |D| ≤ |B|/2. Consequently, the input instance (G, B) belongs to DHC if and only if the output instance (W , t) belongs to SRCP.
The reduction above employs only type-1 entailment constraints, meaning that type-1 entailment is all that is required to drive the complexity of SRCP to the second level of the polynomial hierarchy.
ONE-SHOT RESILIENCY
An impression that one may get from reading [39, 40] is that, with static resiliency as an exception, other notions of workflow resiliency (such as decremental and dynamic resiliency) are largely PSPACEcomplete because of their game-based definition. The goal of this section is to dispel this false impression. We do so by proposing a notion of workflow resiliency that is more sophisticated than static resiliency, and yet remains in the lower levels of the polynomial hierarchy.
Problem Definition
One-shot resiliency is a generalization of static resiliency and a specialization of decremental resiliency. Rather than removing users at the beginning of the game, as in static resiliency, the adversary of one-shot resiliency may wait till a more opportune time, and then remove users in the middle of the game. Yet, unlike decremental resiliency, in which the adversary may "strike" multiple times, the adversary in one-shot resiliency may only strike at most once. The one-shot resiliency game is a two-player game that proceeds in rounds. At any time, the configuration of the game is a pair (∆, θ), where ∆ ⊆ U , and θ is a partial plan. Initially, ∆ and θ are both ∅.
Each round begins by Player 2 opting to either pass or strike, with the restriction that Player 2 must pass in all future rounds after it has struck in a round. If Player 2 chooses to strike, then it further selects no more than t users from U to be placed in ∆. No action is required of Player 2 if it passes. Next, Player 1 extends θ by assigning a member of U \ ∆ to a not-yet-assigned step, so that θ remains causally closed.
Player 2 wins right away if U \ ∆ = ∅, or if θ becomes invalid. Player 1 wins if θ is eventually extended to a valid plan.
One-shot resiliency models situations in which the workflow runs for a moderate length of time (as in decremental resiliency), but a catastrophe is a truly rare event. The latter either does not occur, or else it occurs only once. The effect of the catastrophe is irreversible during the execution of the workflow, as in the cases of static and decremental resiliency (i.e., removed users do not return to the game).
We write ORCP to denote the language containing pairs (W , t) so that W is one-shot resilient for budget t.
The proof of this theorem is left as an exercise for the reader. Even though it is defined in terms of a strategic game, one-shot resiliency remains in the third level of the polynomial hierarchy. 
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A proof of this result will be given in §4.2 and §4.3. This result provides the intellectual justification for deciding one-shot resiliency through a reduction to first-order Answer-Set Programming with bounded predicate arities ( §6)
Membership in
We begin the proof of Σ . This argument turns out to be anything but trivial, and it sheds light on the problem structure of ORCP: there is a short encoding of a winning strategy for Player 1. This insight will be used in our ASP encoding of ORCP in §6.
Suppose W is a workflow authorization policy W . We construct a decision tree T W that captures the "moves" of Player 1. A sequence τ ∈ (S × U ) * is functional if and only if no step appears more than once in τ . Every functional sequence represents a function θ τ that maps steps to users. When θ τ is a valid partial plan, we call τ a play of Player 1. Each play represents a legitimate sequence of "moves" that Player 1 can make (without losing). The decision tree T W is constructed as follows: (a) tree nodes are plays; (b) a play τ is the parent of another play π whenever π = τ · (s, u) (i.e., π is obtained from τ by assigning a user to an additional step). In T W , the empty sequence ϵ is the root of the tree, and a play π is a descendent of another play τ whenever τ is a prefix of π . A play τ is called a terminus whenever θ τ is a valid plan (i.e., every step is assigned). W is satisfiable if and only if T W has at least one terminus.
Suppose t is the budget for Player 2. A strike of Player 2 is a pair of the form (τ , ∆), where τ is a play, dom(θ τ ) S, ∆ ⊆ U , and |∆| ≤ t. The play τ is the trigger of the strike. Intuitively, a strike is a rule that tells Player 2 to remove the users in ∆ immediately after Player 1 has made the moves in τ . A strike (τ , ∆) invalidates a terminus π when (a) π is a descendent of τ in T W , and (b) no user from ∆ is assigned by π after the moves in τ . A strike is successful if and only if it invalidates every terminus that is a descendent of its trigger. A set S of successful strikes is a strategy for Player 2 if the strikes are pairwise independent: two strikes are independent whenever they have distinct triggers that are not descendents of each other. The requirement of independence ensures that Player 2 strikes at most once during a game play. A strategy S of Player 2 is a winning strategy if and only if every terminus of T W is invalidated by a strike in S. A strategy S ′ subsumes another strategy S if and only if (a) every terminus that S invalidates is also invalidated by S ′ , and (a) S ′ invalidates at least one terminus that S does not invalidate. A strategy S is maximal if and only if there it is not subsumed by any other strategy.
Suppose
The idea of Lemma 4.4 can be translated into a non-deterministic algorithm for deciding ORCP, as depicted in Algorithm 1. The algorithm begins by guessing a play π that corresponds to a valid plan θ π , and then check that no prefix τ of π can trigger a successful strike. An insight is that this latter check can be achieved by invoking an SRCP oracle against the "remaining workflow" after the assignments in τ are committed. This notion of the "remaining workflow" is formalized in the following definition, which defines the notation used in line 6. Definition 4.5. Suppose W = (S, , U , A, C) is a workflow authorization policy, and {(s, u)} is a valid partial plan for W . Then project(W , s, u) is the workflow authorization plan (S ′ , ′ , U ′ , A ′ , C ′ ) such that:
and C ′ is defined as follows:
where the notation Θ s, u is defined below:
Intuitively, Θ s, u selects those partial plans in Θ that are consistent with the assignment of u to s, and then eliminates the pair (s, u) from those selected partial plans.
Since SRCP is Π p 2 -complete, Algorithm 1 depends on an NP NP oracle. In addition, Algorithm 1 runs in non-deterministic polynomial time. Therefore, ORCP belongs to Σ 
Σ p

-hardness
To demonstrate that ORCP is hard for Σ p 3 , we present a polynomialtime Karp reduction from SUCCINCT -k-RADIUS to ORCP. The problem SUCCINCT -k-RADIUS is known to be Σ p 3 -complete for every k ≥ 2 [24, 36] .
The radius of a directed graph G = (V , E) is the smallest k such that there exists a vertex u ∈ V such that every vertex ∈ V is reachable from u by some directed path of length no greater than k. (We consider u reachable from itself by a directed path of length zero.) Deciding if G has a radius no greater than k is not hard if G is represented as, say, an access control matrix or adjacency lists. What causes the problem to become intractable is when G is specified using a succinct representation. In such a representation, the adjacency matrix of G is specified through a boolean circuit. Suppose V has a size of 2 n for some n ≥ 1, then vertices can be identified by bit vectors of length n. The adjacency matrix of G can now be represented by a boolean circuit BC G that takes two size-n bit vectors ì x and ì as input, and returns a one-bit value to indicate if there is a directed edge from vertex ì x to vertex ì . Formulated in this way, deciding if the radius of G is bounded by k is Σ p 3 -complete.
Problem: SUCCINCT -k-RADIUS [24] Instance: A boolean circuit BC G that succinctly represents a directed graph G Question: Is the radius of G no greater than k? Given BC G , one can construct a boolean circuit BC reach (ì x, ì ; ì z 1 , ì z 2 , . . . , ì z k−1 ), which takes k + 1 size-n bit vectors as input, and returns 1 if and only if vertex ì is reachable from vertex ì x by a directed path of length no more than k, and that directed path visits intermediate vertices ì z 1 , ì z 2 , etc in that order.
• S z = {z 1 1 , . . . , z 1 n , z 2 1 , . . . , z 2 n , . . . , z k−1 1 , . . . , z k−1 n } contains one step for each bit in ì z 1 , ì z 2 , . . . , ì z k−1 , for a total of n × (k − 1) steps.
• S gate contains one step each gate in BC reach . Intuitively, these steps represent the output bits of the gates.
• S out = {out} contains exactly one step representing the output bit of BC reach . (2) orders the steps in S x first, then S , followed by S z , and then S gate , and lastly S out . (3) Users represent the two boolean values (true and false). A plan can thus be interpreted as an assignment of boolean values to the the input, output, and gates of the boolean circuit BC reach . Although there are only two boolean values, there are multiple copies for each.
There are two variants of boolean values, the ⊤/⊥-variant (U bool ), and the t/f -variant (U ⋆ ). "True" is represented by ⊤-and t-users, and "false" is represented by ⊥-and f -users. Each boolean value of the ⊤/⊥-variant has n + 1 copies (i.e., more than the budget t = n). There are, however, only n copies of each boolean value of the t/f -variant (4) The step authorization policy A describes what type of boolean values can be assigned to each step.
Essentially, boolean values of the ⊤/⊥-variant can be assigned to steps representing ì x, ì z i , and the circuit gates. The output of the entire boolean circuit is forced to be true, as only ⊤-values can be assigned. Only boolean values of the t/f -variant can be assigned to steps representing ì . (5) C = C order ∪ C gate ∪ C out contains three types of constraint.:
(a) Constraints in C gate encode the computation performed by the gates in BC reach . For example, suppose step s ∈ S gate corresponds to an AND gate, which in turn takes its two input bits from the output of the gates represented by steps s 1 , s 2 ∈ S gate . Then we formulate a constraint ({s, s 1 , s 2 }, Θ and ), so that Θ and contains all partial plans θ such that θ(s) is a user representing "true" if and only if both θ(s 1 ) and θ(s 2 ) are users represent "true. " Similar constraints can be formulated for OR gates and NOT gates. (b) C out contains exactly one type-1 entailment constraint ent(equal, out, s), where s ∈ S gate represents the gate that computes the overall output of BC reach , and equal ⊆ U ×U is a binary relation such that (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ equal whenever u 1 and u 2 both represent the same boolean value. Since out ∈ S out can only be assigned ⊤-users, this constraint forces BC reach to output "true. " (c) C order contains a type-1 entailment constraints ent(order, i , i +1 ) for every pair of steps i , i +1 ∈ S . The binary relation order ⊆ U ⋆ × U ⋆ is defined in such a way that ((b 1 , j 1 ), (b 2 , j 2 )) ∈ order if and only if j 1 < j 2 . These constraints forces a linearization of the t/f truth values when they are assigned to ì .
The encoding of the boolean circuit BC reach is straightforward to understand. We explain here how the quantification structure (∃-∀-∃) of formula (4) is captured by the reduction. There are n+1 copies of each boolean value of the ⊤/⊥-variant, but the budget of Player 2 is only t = n. No matter which t users are removed by Player 2, Player 1 can freely assign any boolean values of the ⊤/⊥-variant to the steps representing the bit vectors ì x and ì z i . That is not the case for ì . If Player 2 strikes before the steps in S y are assigned, and it also removes t = n users of the t/f -variant, then there are only n such t/f values left to be assigned to the n steps in S y . In addition, the constraints in C order requires that the remaining t/f -users are assigned to the S y in "sorted order" of their indices. This means that the remaining n boolean values of the t/f -variant are now linearized into a bit vector when they are assigned to ì . In this way, Player 2 can dictate the value of ì . To maximize its control, Player 2 will (a) strike before any of the S -steps are assigned, (b) strike after all the S x -steps are assigned so as to maximize its knowledge of ì x, and (c) remove only users from U ⋆ (since removing users of the ⊤/⊥-variant has no effect on the decisions of Player 1). The overall effect is that Player 1 will first pick ì x, then Player 2 picks ì , and after that Player 1 picks the ì z i 's. This captures exactly the quantification structure of the formula in (4) . Now that we know SRCP and ORCP are respectively complete problems in the second and third level of the polynomial hierarchy, we propose in the following a solution approach for these two problems.
BACKGROUND: ANSWER-SET PROGRAMMING
Answer-Set Programming (ASP) is a declarative programming paradigm [22] . It is essentially Datalog with disjunction and default negation, defined over a stable model semantics. Over the last decades, ASP implementations have become increasingly competitive in efficiency. A notable example of a mature ASP implementation is the Potassco project [33] , which is the ASP solver used in this work. Due to such progress in ASP implementation technologies, reasoning tasks at the lower levels of the polynomial hierarchy have now been regularly encoded in ASP (e.g., [4, 34] ). To these computational problems, ASP plays a role analogous to what SAT is for the NP-complete problems. We offer here a brief introduction to the stable model semantics of propositional ASP. This prepares the reader to understand how the model saturation technique [20] works in the encodings of §6.
We begin with the abstract syntax of propositional ASP. An ASP program P is a finite set of rules. A rule r has the following form:
Here, the a i 's and b i 's are atoms (i.e., propositional symbols), and at most one of m or n can be zero. The head of r , written H (r ), is the set {a 1 , . . . , a n }, and the body of r is B(r ) = {b 1 , . . . , b k , not b k+1 , . . . , not b m }. We write B + (r ) for {b 1 , . . . , b k }, and B − (r ) for {b k+1 , . . . , b m }. A rule with m = 0 is a fact (in which case we omit the ": -"). A rule with n = 0 is an integrity constraint. Intuitively, a rule asserts that one of the head atom holds if the body, read as a conjunction of literals, holds. A fact asserts a (disjunctive) condition unconditionally. An integrity constraint asserts that the body does not hold.
Unlike Prolog, whose semantics is defined procedurally, ASP is purely declarative. The semantics of ASP is defined in terms of stable models [23] . An interpretation I of program P is a set of atoms. I is a model of P if and only if, for every r ∈ P, H (r ) ∩ I ∅ when B + (r ) ⊆ I and B − (r )∩I = ∅. Not every model is stable though. To arrive at the definition of a stable model, we need to define the reduct of P relative to I :
An interpretation I is a stable model of P if and only if I is a ⊆-minimal model of P I . In other words, an I cannot be a stable model of P if P I has a model I ′ that is a proper subset of I . This requirement of minimality is crucial for understanding how the model saturation technique [20] works in the ASP encodings of §6. The definition of stable models can be extended to first-order programs through the use of Hebrand interpretations [19] . The minimality requirement for the models of the reduct carries to the first-order case.
Checking the existence of stable models in the presence of disjunction and default negation is Σ p 2 -complete for propositional ASP [20] , and Σ p 3 -complete for first-order ASP with bounded predicate arities [19] . The complexity results presented in §3 and §4 grant us the rational justification for employing ASP technologies to solve SRCP and ORCP.
ASP ENCODING OF SRCP AND ORCP
ASP is a natural constraint solving technology for tackling problems in the lower levels of the polynomial hierarchy. Solving SRCP and ORCP using ASP does not require us to assume that t is a small parameter (an assumption made in [10] ). This section demonstrates the feasibility of this solution approach by presenting ASP encodings of SRCP and ORCP instances.
The presentation below uses the concrete syntax of logic programs supported by the Potassco collection of ASP solving tools [33] . We do so to ensure realism: our encoding is literally executable. This, however, does not affect the generality of our encoding, as every Potassco-specific syntax employed by our encoding can be reduced to pure ASP [22, Chapter 2] .
In this section, only separation-of-duty constraints are encoded. The encoding can be extended readily to accommodate bindingof-duty, cardinality, and entailment constraints [14, 15] . The focus here is not so much on the encoding of various constraint types in ASP, but on using ASP to express the quantification structure of SRCP and ORCP.
Encoding Static Resiliency
We present an ASP encoding for the complement of SRCP. Given a workflow authorization policy W = (S, ≤, U , A, C) and a budget t ≥ 0, the pair (W , t) belongs to the complement of SRCP if and only if there exists a subset ∆ of no more than t users such that every plan that does not assign users from ∆ will fail to satisfy W .
SRCP ORCP Fact step(s).
for each s ∈ S ignored before(s 1 , s 2 ). whenever s 1 ≺ s 2 user(u). for each u ∈ U auth(s, u).
for each (s, u) ∈ A ignored sod (s 1 , s 2 ) .
for each sod(s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ C Figure 1 : Instance-specific facts used in the ASP encoding of SRCP and ORCP. The predicate before/2 is ignored in the SRCP encoding, while sod/2 is ignored in the ORCP encoding.
1 % Generate Player 2's strike 2 { removed(U) : user(U) } t.
3 % Generate Player 1's assignment 4 avail(S, U) :-auth(S, U), not removed(U). 5 assign(S, U) : avail(S, U) :-step(S).
6 % Test separation-of-duty constraints 7 violation :-8 sod(S1, S2), assign(S1, U), assign(S2, U).
% Model saturation 10 assign(S, U) :-violation, avail(S, U).
11 % Reject unsaturated models 12 :-not violation. In other words, if our ASP encoding is unsatisfiable (has no stable model), then W is statically resilient for budget t. Conversely, if our ASP encoding is satisfiable (has at least one stable model), then every stable model encodes a subset ∆ of users that can be removed by the adversarial environment to render W unsatisfiable. Our ASP encoding is uniform [22, Chapter 3] in the sense that every instance of SRCP can be reduced to a logic program P that can be "factorized" into two parts, a part P C containing rules that are common to all instances of SRCP, and an instance-specific part P I , such that P = P C ∪ P I .
Suppose we have been given an SRCP instance consisting of a workflow authorization policy W = (S, ≤, U , A,C) and a budget t ≥ 0. The instance-specific part of the ASP encoding consists of the facts in Fig. 1 , which describe the components S, ≺, U , A, and C of W . The rules common to all instances of SRCP are listed in Fig. 2 .
The rules on lines 2, 4, and 5 in Fig. 2 are responsible for generating interpretations that serve as candidates for stable models.
Line 2 is a choice rule that models the choice of Player 2. Specifically, it generates up to t ground atoms of the remove/2 predicate in a model candidate. These facts represent the set ∆ of users removed by Player 2.
Line 4 specifies when a user u is available for assignment to a step s, given the choice of ∆ by Player 2. Line 5 is a shorthand that asserts, for each step s, the following disjunction:
where u 1 , . . . , u m are the users identified by predicate avail/2 to be available for assignment to s.
The cumulating effect of the model generation rules (lines 2, 4, and 5) is that an interpretation I ∆,θ will be generated as a model candidate for each user set ∆ of size t or less, and for each plan θ that both complies with the step authorization policy and assigns only users from U \ ∆. Each model candidate I ∆,θ contains, on top of the instance-specific facts in Fig. 1 , the following ground atoms:
There are now two cases:
Case 1: θ is valid. Neither lines 7-8 nor line 10 will be "triggered. " But line 12 will reject I ∆,θ . Case 2: θ is not valid. Then lines 7-8 will detect this case, and introduce the proposition violation into the interpretation under consideration. Moreover, the interpretation will then be saturated by line 10: all possible ground atoms of predicate assign/2 will be added to the interpretation. In short, model candidate I ∆,θ will be "converted" to a superset I ∆, * , which contains, on top of the ground atoms in I ∆,θ , the following ground atoms:
• violation • assign(s, u) for every u available for assignment to s Suppose (W , t) ∈ SRCP. For every choice of ∆, there exists at least one valid plan θ 0 that does not assign users from ∆. Note that the model candidate I ∆,θ 0 will not be saturated, and thus it will be rejected by line 12. Not only that, the saturated model I ∆, * is not a minimal model for P I ∆, * , because its proper subset I ∆,θ 0 is also a model for P I ∆, * . Consequently, no stable model exists for the program P.
Conversely, suppose (W , t) SRCP. Then there is a ∆ 0 such that every plan θ that does not assign users from ∆ 0 is invalid. This means that Case 1 above never holds for this choice of ∆ 0 . This also means that every model candidate I ∆ 0 ,θ is converted into a saturated model I ∆ ⋆ , * . As none of the interpretations I ∆ 0 ,θ is a model for P I ∆ ⋆ , * , I ∆ ⋆ , * is the minimal model for P I ∆ ⋆ , * . The program P has at least one stable model.
We have thus demonstrated that it is feasible to use ASP for encoding SRCP. The key is to use an advanced ASP programming technique known as model saturation [20] to encode the quantification structure (i.e., ∃-∀) of SRCP's complement. We now examine an extension of this technique for encoding ORCP.
Encoding One-shot Resiliency
The crux in designing an ASP encoding of ORCP lies in capturing the quantification structure of Σ p 3 (i.e., ∃-∀-∃). To this end, we employ the advanced adaption of model saturation as found in the proof of Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 in [19] . Unlike the encoding in §6.1, the ASP encoding of ORCP presented here is not uniform. It cannot be factorized into an instancespecific set of facts and a set of of rules that are common to all instances. More specifically, ORCP is encoded using the instancespecific facts in Fig. 1 and the rules in Fig. 3 . Note that lines 18-20 of Fig. 3 are only examples. Each ORCP instance will have a different formulation of those lines, depending on what constraints are in C.
Our ASP encoding of ORCP basically follows the idea of Lemma 4.4, and thus Fig. 3 could be seen as an ASP variant of Algorithm 1:
(1) The logic program "guesses" a functional sequence τ that encodes the strategy of Player 1. (2) Then model saturation is employed for capturing the universal quantification of Player 2's strikes. (3) Lastly, testing whether a prefix π of τ can be extended to a terminus is performed without model generation rules.
Generating Player 1's strategy. The first part of Player 1's strategy is a plan, which is represented by the predicate assign/2. Using a choice rule, line 2 generates, for each step s, exactly one fact of the form assign(s, u) if user u is authorized to execute step s.
The second part of Player 1's strategy is a total ordering of steps. This is represented by the predicate order/2, which is generated by lines 5-8. More specifically, lines 5-6 generate, for every pair of distinct steps X and Y , either order(X , Y ) or order(Y , X ). Line 7 ensures that the generated ordering honors the ordering constraints of the workflow, and line 8 ensures transitivity.
Generating Player 2's strike. The strike of Player 2 is generated by lines 9-13. There are two parts to the strike. The first part is a subset ∆ of users to be removed. Line 13 is a shorthand that asserts, for each user u, the disjunction below:
The alert reader will notice that no constraint on the size of ∆ is placed here. As we shall see, the size is controlled by having Player 2 loses the game if it picks more than t users in ∆ (see line 22) .
The second part of Player 2's strike is the choice of a round to launch the strike. This choice is generated by lines 10-11. More specifically, every step is labelled as either "pre-strike" or "poststrike" by line 10. A pre-strike step is one that is ordered before the launch point according to the total ordering chosen by Player 1 above; otherwise, the step is post-strike. Line 11 ensures that poststrike steps are never ordered before pre-strike steps.
Testing if a prefix of Player 1's strategy can be extended to a terminus. Lines 14-20 check whether, after the strike chosen by Player 2, the assignments made prior to the strike by Player 1 can be extended to a valid plan. This section can be further divided into two subsections: (a) lines 15-16, and (b) lines 18-20.
Lines 15-16 determine which user s is available for assignment to which step s after the strike. For pre-strike steps, the assignment is fixed according to Player 1's strategy (line 15). For post-strike steps, authorized users who have not been removed by the strike are available (line 16).
Then comes lines 18-20, which mark the interpretation by the marker proposition sat whenever the workflow authorization policy is found to be satisfiable (given Player 1's strategy and Player 2's strike). This is the part of the encoding that has been inspired by the proof of Lemma 7 in [19] . The main feature of this section is that satisfiability is checked without model generation rules (e.g., choice rules and disjunctive rules). Instead, a single rule is used. This rule, however, is instance specific: a different rule of this form will have to be formulated for each ORCP instance. The rule considers all possible user assignments to the steps (line 19), and then checks the SOD constraints inline (line 20). By encoding the nested existential quantification without model generation rules, we can reuse the model saturation technique to encode the outer existential-universal quantifications.
Other mechanics. Line 22 ensures that Player 2 plays according to the budget. If Player 2 removes more than t users, then Player 1 wins: i.e., the workflow authorization policy is considered satisfied.
If the workflow authorization policy is satisfiable (i.e., the proposition sat is part of the model), then lines 24-28 will saturate the model by producing all possible ground atoms that can ever be asserted as a result of Player 2's choice. Finally, line 30 rejects unsaturated models. Using an argument analogous to the one in §6.1, one can demonstrate that a stable model exists if and only if Player 1 has a winning strategy.
RELATED WORK
The notion of resiliency was introduced into the study of access control by Li et al., originally in the context of RBAC rather than in workflow authorization models [27, 28] . Significant recent advances have been achieved in employing parameterized complexity analysis to facilitate the design of efficient algorithms for the Resiliency Checking Problem (RCP) [13] . In particular, the efficient FPT algorithms designed for WSP is employed as subroutines for solving RCP. There is also interest in formulating "resiliency"-variants of combinatorial problems in general [11] . A form of resiliency checking problem has also been defined for Relationship-Based Access Control (ReBAC), in the context of policy negotiation performed among co-owners of the a resource [32] . ReBAC resiliency checking was shown to be complete for Π p 2 . That result, however, is significantly different from Theorem 3.1 of the present paper. First, ReBAC resiliency is about an adversary who can remove relationship edges in an underlying social graph, whereas the adversary of workflow resiliency removes users. Second, the hardness proof of [32] involves a reduction from the Graph Consistency problem, and is therefore fundamentally different from the one presented in this paper. In general, the nature of RCP is different from workflow resiliency, as the latter contains an element of dynamism, allowing the adversarial environment to remove users as the workflow is executing.
The idea of workflow resiliency was first introduced by Wang and Li [39, 40] . The present paper bridges the complexity gap of static resiliency that existed since the first conception of the idea a decade ago.
Two notable lines of recent research explore new directions in the study of workflow resiliency. Mace et al. [29] [30] [31] pointed out that simply knowing whether a workflow is resilient or not is not sufficient. The real interest of the workflow developer is to receive feedback from the policy analysis in order to repair the workflow. They proposed a quantitative model of resiliency in response to this need. The idea is to build a probabilistic adversary model, and then formulate a Markov Decision Process to capture how users are removed over time. While the insight of their perspective is acknowledged, it is the position of this paper that multiple notions of resiliency are needed in order to provide insights into the workflow engineering process. The proposal of one-shot resiliency is partly motivated by this consideration.
A second recent work on workflow resiliency is the FPT algorithm of Crampton et al. for deciding dynamic resiliency [10] . Unfortunately, the parameter they used involves the budget t of the adversary, which is not universally considered small. It is therefore necessary to consider solution approaches that do not assume a small t. The proposal of ASP as a solution approaches for static and one-shot resiliency in the present work is a response to this challenge.
Kahn and Fong proposed workflow feasibility as a dual notion of workflow resiliency [25] . The idea is based whether the current protection state can be repaired to make the workflow satisfiable. Feasibility checking is also defined for ReBAC [32] , and shown to be complete for Σ p 2 .
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We proved that static resiliency is complete for Π p 2 , thereby solving a problem that has been open for more than a decade since Wang and Li first proposed the notion of workflow resiliency [39, 40] .
We have also demonstrated that useful notions of workflow resiliency need not be PSPACE-hard. The fact that we can define a notion of workflow resiliency (one-shot resiliency) that remains in the lower levels of the polynomial hierarchy (Σ p 3 ) implies that the lower complexity of static resiliency is not an exception.
The completeness of SRCP and ORCP in the second and third level of the polynomial hierarchy also suggests that Answer-Set Programming is a natural choice of constraint-solving technology for solving the two problems (without having to assume that t is a small parameter). We have demonstrated the feasibility of this approach by presenting ASP encodings of SRCP and ORCP. These encodings involve the application of the model saturation technique [20] and its advanced adaptation [19] .
A number of research directions are suggested below:
(1) It is unlikely that the ASP encodings of SRCP and ORCP presented in §6 are the most efficient ones. Since the encodings are formulated mainly for demonstration of feasibility, they are optimized for brevity. It is well-known that the efficiency of ASP programs can benefit from advanced optimization techniques [22] . A natural follow-up work is to explore these optimization techniques, and empirically benchmark the performance of ASP-based solutions for SRCP and ORCP. A promising direction is to combine the pattern-based technique of [5, 6] with ASP-solving. (2) The proposal of ORCP affirms the possibility for defining alternative notions of workflow resiliency beyond the three advanced by Wang and Li. ORCP not only avoids the PSPACEcompleteness of CRCP and DRCP, but also admits encoding in first-order ASP with bounded predicate arities. An interesting research direction is to explore if there are other useful formulations of workflow resiliency that also reside in the lower levels of the polynomial hierarchy. (3) The source of complexity for PSPACE-complete notions of workflow resiliency (i.e., CRCP and DRCP) is that the adversary model is overly powerful. An open question is whether there are alternative adversary models for workflow resiliency that involve a less powerful adversary and still lead to useful notions of availability for workflow authorization models. (In some sense, the quantitative model of Mace et al. could be seen as an alternative adversary model [29] [30] [31] .)
The existing adversary model is framed in terms of a budget t, and a flexible consumption schedule of this budget. Alternative adversary models can envision a different way in which the adversarial environment interacts with workflow execution. Consider, for example, a small-accidents variant of decremental resiliency, in which at most one user may be removed in each round. The assumption that k + t is small now makes a lot of sense in this adversary model, and the FPT algorithm of [10] is genuinely reasonable in this model. Creative deviation from the adversary model of Wang and Li is therefore a promising research direction. (4) FPT-reductions to SAT may be possible for some notions of workflow resiliency. It is now a standard problem-solving technique to seek FPT reductions of hard problems to SAT , so as to exploit the efficiency of SAT -solving technologies [17, 18] . Bounded Model Checking is often cited as an example of this approach. An even more general approach is to consider FPT algorithms that query a SAT -solver multiple times (i.e., FPT Turing reductions) [16] . An open question is whether static and one-shot resiliency can be solved via FPT reductions to SAT , and if not, whether there are other useful notions of workflow resiliency that can be solved in this way.
